Commercial Paper: Depository Bank Liable to Drawer for Payment over Forged Indorsement by Sprague, Neil E.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 45 
Issue 3 Summer 1980 Article 7 
Summer 1980 
Commercial Paper: Depository Bank Liable to Drawer for Payment 
over Forged Indorsement 
Neil E. Sprague 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Neil E. Sprague, Commercial Paper: Depository Bank Liable to Drawer for Payment over Forged 
Indorsement, 45 MO. L. REV. (1980) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss3/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 




DEPOSITARY BANK LIABLE TO DRAWER
FOR PAYMENT OVER FORGED INDORSEMENT
Underpinning & Foundation Constructors, Inc. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, N.A.1
Walker, an employee in the accounting department of Underpinning
and Foundation Constructors, Inc., used various schemes to embezzle ap-
proximately one million dollars during the course of an eighteen month
period. One particularly profitable device used by Walker was to submit
false invoices from firms with which Underpinning did considerable busi-
ness. After obtaining signatures on the respective checks Walker forged the
indorsements of the named payees by using rubber stamps similar to those
used by each respective payee. These stamps contained restrictive indorse-
ments, such as "for deposit only," which required that the checks be de-
posited only in the account of the named payee. Walker presented these
checks at various banks and either cashed or deposited them in savings
accounts other than the accounts of the named payees-a clear violation of
the restrictive indorsements. The banks put these checks through the
normal collection process by presenting them to the drawee bank, which
accepted: and paid the checks. The drawee bank then debited Underpinn-
ing's account for the amount of the checks.
Upon discovering the embezzlement scheme Underpinning filed an
action against each of the depositary banks which had accepted the checks
in violation of the restrictive indorsements. Bank of New York, one of the
defendants in the suit, filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss on the theory
that the drawer of a check may never sue a depositary bank but instead is
limited to any claims it might have against the drawee bank. Indeed, this
had been the rule in New York prior to the adoption of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.2 The New York Court of Appeals disagreed with the bank's
contention and held that the drawer of a check may sue a depositary bank
which accepts a check in violation of a restrictive indorsement where the
1. 46 N.Y.2d 459, 386 N.E.2d 1319, 414 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1979).
2. Trojan Pub. Corp. v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 298 N.Y. 771, 83 N.E.2d
465 (1948) (memorandum) (conversion and money had and received).
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indorsement, although forged, is nonetheless "effective." 3 Liability of the
depositary banks was based on the theories of conversion or money had
and received. By its decision the court recognized an important, although
limited exception to the general rule that a drawer has no cause of action
against a depositary bank.
Prior to adoption of the Code, courts were split on the issue of whether
to permit a direct action by a drawer against a depositary bank, although a
slight majority allowed such a cause of action.4 Pre-Code cases were suc-
cessfully brought under several substantive theories,5 two of which were
relied upon in Underpinning. Recovery for conversion is based on the
premise that when the drawee bank wrongfully debits the drawer's account
and pays that amount to the depositary bank, the depositary bank has
wrongfully appropriated funds belonging to the drawer.6 Money had and
received is an equitable action based on the view that when a depositary
bank accepts checks over forged indorsements, the bank does not acquire
title to the checks but holds the proceeds for the payee or rightful owner
who may recover for money had and received. 7 Despite the success of
actions brought under either of these two theories, several states have
rejected not only these, but other theories of recovery as well.8
3. N.Y. U.C.C. § 3405(1) (McKinney 1964) states in part: "[A]n indorsement
by any person in the name of a named payee is effective if .. . (c) an agent
or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied him with the name of the
payee intending the latter to have no such interest." The New York statute is
identical to U.C.C. § 3-405(I)(c). Hereinafter, citations will be made only to the
1978 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code.
4. 10 Am. JuR. 2d Banks § 629 (1963); 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 254
(1938). The pre-Code position in Missouri is unclear. In First Nat'l Bank v. Pro-
duce Exch. Bank, 338 Mo. 91, 89 S.W.2d 33 (1935), it was held that a collecting
bank which accepted cashier's checks bearing fored indorsements could be liable
to the issuing bank. Since the case involved cashier's checks, however, the drawer
was also the drawee bank and the court did not state whether the drawer would
have a cause of action if it had not also been the drawee-payor bank. No theory
of recovery was discussed.
5. Washington Mechanics' Say. Bank v. District Title Ins. Co., 65 F.2d
827 (D.C. Cir. 1933) (dictum) (conversion and money had and received), Home
Indemn. Co. v. State Bank, 233 Iowa 103, 8 N.W.2d 757 (1943) (title had not
passed to the collecting bank, therefore the drawer had a cause of action for
conversion of the checks and their proceeds); Railroad Bldg. Loan & Say. Ass'n
v. Bankers Mortgage Co., 142 Kan. 564, 51 P.2d 61 (1935) (dictum) (conversion
and money had and received); Greenville Natl Exch. Bank v. Nussbaum, 154
S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (collecting bank which accepts a check bear-
ing a forged indorsement acquires no title and holds the proceeds for the drawer,
who may sue for money had and received).
6. Comment, Drawer v. Collecting Bank for Payment of Checks on Forged
Indorsements-Direct Suit Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 45 TEMP.
L.Q. 102 n.5 (1971).
7. Id. at n.6.
8. See, e.g., California Mill Supply Corp. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust
& Say. Ass'n, 36 Cal. 2d 334, 223 P.2d 849 (1950) (conversion) (court acknowledged
split of authority but stated in general language that arguments against direct
action represented the sounder view); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. San Fran-
cisco Bank, 58 Cal. App. 2d 528, 136 P.2d 853 (1943) (conversion; warranty)
(no cause of action for conversion because the checks were non-negotiable, had
2
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The Uniform Commercial Code does not expressly provide for a
direct action by a drawer against a depositary bank, a factor which has
contributed to inconsistent court decisions. The first judicial application
of the Code to this issue appeared in the seminal case of Stone & Webster
Engineering Corp. v. First National Bank.9 There the court held that the
drawer of a check had no cause of action against a depositary bank which
accepted a check bearing a forged indorsement. The money had and re-
ceived theory of recovery was found to be inapplicable because the deposi-
tary bank had no money in its hands which belonged to the drawer. Fur-
thermore, the drawer had no right in the proceeds of its own check, payable
to the payee. Recovery was likewise denied under the theory of conversion
because the Code provides that conversion occurs when a check is paid
over a forged indorsement and only a payor bank can pay on an instru-
ment.10 This limitation necessarily excludes depositary banks."
The principal reason the court in Stone & Webster would deny a
drawer a direct cause of action against a depositary bank in a case where
the drawee bank is liable to the drawer and the depositary bank is liable
to the drawee bank stems from the various defenses provided by the Code.' 2
The first defense is found in section 3-406 which precludes a drawer, who
by his negligence substantially contributes to the forgery, from asserting
the forgery against a drawee bank.13 A second defense, which prevents a
drawer from recovering payment on a forged instrument from the drawee
bank unless the drawee bank is notified of the forgery within three years,
appears in subsection (4) of section 4-406. This subsection imposes a duty
on the drawer to review promptly bank statements and cancelled checks.
In addition to the defenses provided a drawee bank, the Code confers
a defense on the depositary bank when sued by the drawee bank. Subsection
(5) of section 4-406 provides that the drawee bank is precluded from
asserting a claim against a depositary bank based on a forged indorsement
if the drawee bank has a valid defense against the drawer and waives or
fails upon request to assert it. The court in Stone & Webster recognized
been made out to fictitious payees, and therefore were of no value); First Nat'l
Bank v. North Jersey Trust Co., 18 N.J. Misc. 449, 14 A.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. 1940)(conversion) (drawer was not a payor and therefore had no right to immediate
possession of the check). The theories of warranty, assignment of warranty, im-
plied contract, and negligence are discussed in notes 27-30 and accompanying
text infra. See also Railroad Bldg. Loan & Say. Ass'n v. Bankers Mortgage Co.,
142 Kan. 564, 51 P.2d 61 (1935) (direct action supported in dictum under
conversion or money had and received, but no direct action on a warranty theory).
9. 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962).
10. Id. at 5-6, 184 N.E.2d at 361.
11. Id. A "payor bank" is defined in U.C.C. § 4-105(b) as "a bank by which
an item is payable as drawn or accepted."
12. 345 Mass. at 8-10, 184 N.E.2d at 363.
13. See generally Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner S Smith, Inc., 348
F. Supp. 969 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Twellman v. Lindell Trust Co., 534 S.W.2d83 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Mordy, Forged and Altered Instruments Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 24 J. Mo. BAR 424, 428-29 (1968).
1980]
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that, assuming all the drawee bank's defenses were available to the de-
positary bank in a suit brought by the drawer, the depositary bank would
confront practical problems in successfully asserting these defenses. The
drawee bank is generally in a better position to know the drawer's business
practices, which would be essential in determining whether a defense
under sections 3-406 or 4-406 is available. Furthermore, the drawee bank
probably would not share this information voluntarily because the drawer
is its customer and the depositary bank is often a competitor. As stated in
Stone & Webster, "The possibilities of such a result would tend to compel
resort to litigation in every case involving a forgery of commercial paper."' 4
The court found the practical problems involved in asserting applicable
defenses to outweigh any positive aspect of allowing a direct action.
The court in Underpinning distinguished the typical forged indorse-
ment situation where the indorsement is wholly inoperative'15 from that in
which theindorsement, although forged, is effective. 16 In the former, the
funds paid to the forger are the property of the drawee bank since the bank
is not authorized to charge the drawer's account for the amount of the
check. It follows, therefore, that the depositary bank's disposition of those
funds does not constitute conversion of the drawer's property."t When the
indorsement is effective, on the other hand, the drawee bank is authorized
to debit the drawer's account. In this situation the drawer has an interest
in the proceeds of the check.' 8 Since the indorsement in such a case is
effective, the eventual debit to the drawer's account is authorized and the
14. 345 Mass. at 10, 184 N.E.2d at 863. But see International Indus., Inc.
v. Island State Bank, 348 F. Supp. 886 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (money had and received;
assignment of warranty) (pre-Code cases in Texas had allowed a direct action
for money had and received and the Code contained no provision which would
change this result; issue of defenses not discussed); Commercial Credit Corp. v.
Citizens Nat'l Bank, 150 W. Va. 196, 144 S.E.2d 784 (1965) (money had and
received) (avoidance of circuity sufficient reason to allow a direct action; dis-
agrees with Stone & Webster argument that the depositary bank would have diffi-
culty asserting certain defenses).
15. U.C.C. § 8-404(1) provides:
Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the person
whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from denying
it; but it operates as the signature of the unauthorized signer in favor
of any person who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for
value.
U.C.C. § 1.201(48) defines unauthorized indorsement as "one made without actual,
implied, or apparent authority and includes a forgery." (Emphasis added.)
16. See note 3 supra; U.C.C. § 8-405, Comment 4. See generally Tweilman
v. Lindell Trust Co., 534 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976); Mordy, supra note
13, at 426-28.
17. 46 N.Y.2d at 465, 886 N.E.2d at 1321, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 800. Similarly, since
the funds belong to the drawee bank and not the drawer, the depositary bank has
not had and received any money of the drawer. The court also noted that, because
the drawer is not a holder and could not present the check for payment, the drawer
has no interest in the physical check. Therefore, there can be no liability for con-
version of. the check itself. See W. BRrroN, BiL.s AND NoTEs (2d ed. 1961);
6 A. MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING ch. 10, §§ 87-88 (1975).
18. 46 N.Y.2d at 466, 386 N.E.2d at 1322, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
[Vol. 45
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depositary bank cannot be liable in conversion for paying over the effective,
albeit forged, indorsement. For these reasons the court in Underpinning
held that the drawer may maintain a direct action against the depositary
bank "only in those comparatively rare instances in which the depositary
bank has acted wrongfully and yet the drawee has acted properly.'/19
The Uniform Commercial Code offers support for liability of a de-
positary bank where it disregards a restrictive indorsement irrespective of
whether the indorsement has been forged. Prior to adoption of the Code
each bank in the collection process could be liable for violation of a
restrictive indorsement.2 0 The Code changed this by limiting the duty to
act consistently with the restrictive indorsement to the first taker of the
check.2 1 The rationale is that the first taker has the best opportunity to
insure that the restriction is satisfied.22 Applied to Underpinning, this
means that the drawee bank acted properly in honoring the check, while
the depositary bank was responsible for violating the restrictive indorse-
ment.
By allowing a direct action against the depositary bank, the Under-
pinning court observed the mandate of section 1-102 which provides that
the Code "shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its under-
lying purposes and policies." One underlying purpose of Article 3 is the
allocation of loss to the party with the greatest power and best opportunity
to prevent such a loss. 23 At times this may place liability on the drawer as
a matter of law.24 Presumably this would have been the result in Under-
pinning had it not been for the restrictive nature of the forged indorse-
ments. Since the forged indorsement was made "effective" by operation of
the Code, the drawer typically would not have a cause of action against
any of the banks involved. But in Underpinning the court held that "the
failure to [pay a check in accordance with a restrictive indorsement] serves
as a basis of liability independent of any liability which might be created
by payment over a forged indorsement alone."2 5
Decisions under the Code which allow a direct cause of action by the
drawer against a depositary bank generally have relied on theories other
19. Id.
20. Soma v. Handrulis, 277 N.Y. 223, 14 N.E.2d 46 (1938).
21. U.C.C. § 3-206(2) provides: "An intermediary bank, or a payor bank
which is not the depositary bank, is neither given notice nor otherwise affected
by a restrictive indorsement of any person except the bank's immediate transferor
or the person presenting for payment." See U.C.C. § 3-206, Comment 3. See also
V.A.M.S. § 400.3-206, Missouri Code Comment (1965); Comment, Restrictive
Indorsements Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 24 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 616, 627
(1963).
22. U.C.C. § 3-206, Comment 3.
23. White, Some Petty Complaints About Article Three, 65 MicH. L. Rv.
1315, 1323 (1967).
24. Id. See also Mordy, supra note 13, at 426.
25. 46 N.Y.2d at 469, 386 N.E.2d at 1323, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
1980]
5
Sprague: Sprague: Commercial Paper: Depository Bank Liable
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
than conversion or money had and received.2 6 Some courts have allowed
a direct cause of action on a warranty theory by holding that the drawer is
a third-party beneficiary of the warranty of prior indorsements which
runs from the depositary bank to subsequent holders in due course.27 A
direct action also has been upheld where the drawer is the assignee of the
drawee bank's warranty claim. 28 Still another successful theory has been
that of an implied contract in which a depositary bank has an implied
obligation to pay to the true owner the money received and erroneously
paid over the forged indorsement.2 9 A more recent theory is that a deposi-
tary bank is negligent if it fails to follow reasonable commercial standards
in ascertaining the genuineness of indorsements8 0
Two procedural techniques have been suggested as alternatives to
allowing a direct suit by a drawer against a depositary bank. The first is
"vouching-in," a procedure authorized by section 3-803 which allows the
drawee to notify the depositary bank to join and defend the suit brought
by the drawer. The depositary bank, however, is not compelled to become
part of the lawsuit and if it chooses not to join, the only effect is that it
is bound by any common determinations of fact in the drawer's suit against
26. In fact, several post-Code decisions have held that a drawer may not
sue a depositary bank on the theories of conversion or money had and received.
See, e.g., Central Cadillac, Inc. v. Stern Haskell, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1280 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (conversion) (the absence of a specific Code provision dictates following
prior New York law in denying a direct action); Allied Concord Fin. Corp. v.
Bank of America, 275 Cal. App. 2d 1, 80 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1969) (no conversion
because the money paid over the forged indorsement does not belong to the
drawer; direct action upheld, however, on a warranty theory); Life Ins. Co. v.
Snyder, 141 N.J. Super. 539, 358 A.2d 859 (Passaic County Ct. 1976) (elements of
conversion lacking because the drawer had no right to immediate possession of the
check).
27. Allied Concord Fin. Corp. v. Bank of America, 275 Cal. App. 2d 1, 80
Cal. Rptr. 622 (1969) (importance of reducing circuity of actions stressed). In
Sun 'n Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 329 (1978), and Insurance Co. v. Atlas Supply Co., 121 Ga. App. 1, 172
S.E.2d 632 (1970), the courts allowed a direct cause of action by the drawer
using the rationale that a drawer is an "other payor," and thus is entitled to
claim the benefit of § 4-207 warranties. But see Central Cadillac, Inc. v. Stern
Haskell, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1280 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Life Ins. Co. v. Snyder, 141
N.J. Super. 539, 358 A.2d 859 (Passaic County Ct. 1976). These two cases held that
the drawer was not a "payor bank or other payor" for purposes of § 4-207.
28. International Indus., Inc. v. Island State Bank, 348 F. Supp. 886 (S.D.
Tex. 1971); Commonwealth v. National Bank & Trust Co., 90 Dauph. 71, 46 Pa.
D. & C.2d 141 (1968).
29. Columbian Peanut Co. v. Frosteg, 472 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 824 (1973); Commercial Ins. Co. v. First Sec. Bank, 15 Utah 2d 193,
389 P.2d 742 (1964) (pre-Code decision). See also Comment, supra note 6, at
103 n.7.
30. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 315 F. Supp. 520 (E.D.
Wis. 1970); Sun 'n Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920,
148 Cal. IRptr. 329 (1978). But see Chartered Bank v. American Trust Co., 48
Misc. 2d 314, 264 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (absent a defect on the face of
the instrument, the drawer must seek recovery from the drawee).
[Vol. 45
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the drawee bank.3 1 A second alternative is to allow the drawee bank to
implead the depositary bank where local rules of procedure allow such
third-party practice.3 2 A drawback of both alternatives is that they leave
unresolved the problem of circuitous lawsuits since all three parties are
still involved in the action.
Several policy reasons have been advanced by the courts for allowing
a drawer to sue a depositary bank.3 3 One policy already mentioned is the
avoidance of circuity of actions: judicial economy discourages two lawsuits
where one suit would sufficiently dispose of all issues and disputes. Another
policy reason for allowing a direct action is to foster the banking relation-
ship between the drawer and the drawee bank. Some courts have applied
these policy considerations to reach what they considered to be the most
equitable result, with little concern for the legal principles involved. As
indicated above, the courts allowing a direct cause of action under the
Code have not been able to agree on any particular substantive theory.
Some pre-Code decisions allowed a direct action without even discussing a
substantive theory.3 4
The opposite approach is taken by authorities who stress the import-
ance of a sound substantive basis in the Code. At least one commentator
believes that Article 3 was intended to bar a direct suit by a drawer against
a depositary bank, despite the circuity of actions which results.3 5 The
absence of a specific authorization to recover and the circular pattern of
liability established in the Code lend support to this strict approach.36
In Underpinning, the Court of Appeals of New York was able to bridge
the gap between the result-oriented and the substantive-minded groups.
The opinion first reinforces the general rule with a full explanation of
why, in the typical situation, a drawer may not sue a depositary bank
which wrongfully accepts checks bearing forged indorsements. The court
then created an exception to this general rule by utilizing Code provisions
to impose a special duty on the first bank in the collection process to
comply with the terms of a restrictive indorsement. The result was to
uphold public policy considerations while maintaining a firm substantive
basis in the Code.
Underpinning may hold strong precedential value in Missouri and
31. See Bank of St. Helens v. Clayton Bank, 502 S.W.2d 449 (Mo. App., St. L.
1973).
32. H. BAImEY, BRaDY ON BANK CIrcxs 111 (Supp. 1971).
33. McDonnell, The Rapid Decline of Privity in the Modem Law of Com-
mercial Paper, 30 Bus. LAw. 203, 223-25 (1974).
34. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Guaranty Life Ins. Co., 45 Ga. App. 289,
164 S.E. 212 (1932); Gustin-Bacon Mfg. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 306 11. 179,
137 N.E. 793 (1922); Sidles Co. v. Pioneer Valley Say. Bank, 233 Iowa 1057, 8
N.W.2d 794 (1943).
35. McDonnell, supra note 33, at 206-07 & n.21.
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